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The past two decades have been marked by major achievements in the
area of civil rights. The judiciary, armed with the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, has been a potent force in this movement
toward egalitarianism. Beginning with the landmark case of Brown v.
Board of Education,' wherein the anomalous doctrine of "separate but
equal" was officially laid to rest, courts have sanctioned,' as well as initi-
ated,3 remedial programs designed to eliminate the effects of past racial
* This article is a student work prepared by Donald J. Rosenberg, a member of the ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The courts have repeatedly rejected attacks on "color conscious" school integration
programs. See, e.g., Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968); School
Comm'r v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S.
572 (1968); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 881 (1964). See also Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 944 (1971), wherein the court of appeals ruled that discarding the promotional lists
previously used to determine appointments for principal and vice-principal in Newark, New
Jersey, in order to achieve greater racial balance in the school faculty, did not violate any
constitutional rights.
I The evolution of school desegregation cases provides an example of increasing court involve-
ment in the area of race relations. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), dealt with
the implementation of desegregation principles enunciated by the Court a year earlier. The
standard established was "with all deliberate speed .... " Id. at 301. In the 1963 decision
in Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963), the Court emphasized that this should not be
used as an excuse for delaying desegregation. A year later, the Supreme Court was faced with
a case dealing with a desegregation plan in Prince Edward County, Virginia. This county,
one of those involved in the original Brown decision, had continually avoided implementa-
tion. The Court remanded, urging, "quick and effective" relief. Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
By the mid-1960's, it was clear to the judiciary that "[d]elays in desegregating public
school systems are no longer tolerable." Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965) (per
curiam). Eventually, the Court officially dropped the standard of "all deliberate speed" and
required school boards "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now." Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)
(emphasis in original); accord, Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969),
wherein the Court stated that the Fifth Circuit
should have denied all motions for additional time because continued operation of
segregated schools under a standard of allowing 'all deliberate speed' for desegregation
is no longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court the
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discrimination. Concomitant with the more aggressive state and federal
affirmative actions in this regard, however, has been an ever strengthening
undercurrent of claims of "reverse discrimination." Courts have had to
deal with these accusations on a case by case basis, often viewing such
claims as "the height of irony,"' or simply "unrealistic." 5 Yet, these asser-
tions cannot be too easily dismissed. Indeed, this issue has spawned a
controversy of national proportion mandating consideration not only in
terms of constitutional justice, but also in terms of social justice.
The Supreme Court was recently presented with an opportunity to
review a claim of reverse discrimination involving preferential admissions
policies of a state law school.' In DeFunis v. Odegaard7 a white student,
denied admission to the University of Washington School of Law (Wash-
ington Law School), charged, inter alia, that the school's selection process
deprived him of equal protection of the law by favoring minority groups.
A definitive resolution of the controversy therein had the potential to pro-
duce as great an effect upon the civil rights movement as did Brown twenty
years ago.' Certainly, it would have engendered far-reaching implications
for minority access to higher education. Moreover, the decision's impact
could conceivably have affected segments of society not directly involved.,
obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to
operate now and hereafter only unitary schools.
Id. at 20.
The pinnacle of judicial activism in eliminating de jure segregation in public schools was
reached by the Supreme Court with its affirmance of a Fourth Circuit plan of busing students
in order to effectively implement the holding of Brown. See Swann v. Board of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971). See generally Comment, From Brown to Swann - The New Role of Equity in
Integration, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 555 (1971); Note, Desegregation of Public Schools: AnAffirma-
tive Duty to Eliminate Racial Segregation Root and Branch, 20 SYR. L. REV. 52 (1968).
1 School Comm'r v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729, 733 (1967), appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968).
1 Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25, 34 (D.N.J. 1964), vacated on other grounds, 351 F.2d 323
(3d Cir. 1965), merits of original opinion adhered to, 250 F. Supp. 81 (D.N.J. 1966).
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974), vacating 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
Id.
Indicative of the great interest surrounding the controversy and accenting the importance
of the issues was the extraordinary number of amicus curiae briefs filed in support of both
sides. Sixty organizations submitted a total of thirty briefs to the Supreme Court. In sympa-
thy with the law school's preferential admissions policy were such groups as the Association
of American Law Schools, the American Bar Association, the Council on Legal Education
Opportunities, the Law School Admissions Council, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Black American Law Students Association, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund.
Those allied with DeFunis' contentions included the AFL-CIO, the National Association of
Manufacturers, the Advocate Society, the Joint Civic Action Committee of Italian-
Americans, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the National Jewish Com-
munity Rights Council.
I Affirmative action programs are most prevalent in the area of employment. Both the federal
government and numerous states have established requirements for unions and industry
aimed at increasing minority representation. These programs have met with much opposition
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Had the Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court and declared pref-
erential admissions policies violative of a displaced white applicant's con-
stitutional rights, every federal and state program aimed at correcting past
racial discrimination might have been jeopardized. Conversely, affirmance
would have lent itself to the interpretation that ameliorative admissions
policies are constitutionally permissible, no matter how adversely individ-
ual interests are affected.
To the dismay of those on both sides of the controversy, the Supreme
Court avoided direct confrontation of the issues by declaring the case
moot.'0 The law school had admitted DeFunis under order of the trial
court. " Although the lower court was reversed by the Washington Supreme
Court, Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, granted a stay of judgment
pending disposition by the United States Supreme Court. 2 Because the
law school authorities announced to the High Court that DeFunis would
be permitted to complete his legal studies, 3 it was held that there no longer
existed a concrete controversy between the parties."
Whether the Court's analysis of the question of mootness was dictated
by precedent is not the concern of this note. Suffice it to say that four
dissenting Justices did not feel so compelled and raised strong arguments
in support of their views. Irrespective of the validity of the majority's,
but have successfully weathered most challenges in the courts. See text accompanying notes
64-96 infra. See generally Blurnrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations:
Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RuTomas L. REv. 675 (1974); Blumrosen,
Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972); Hill, New Judicial Perception of Employment
Discrimination - Litigation Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 243 (1972); Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 341 (1970).
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1707 (1974).
See id. at 1705. The lower court had ruled that the law school's admissions policy violated
DeFunis' rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See text
accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
" 94 S. Ct. at 1705.
13 By the time the Supreme Court heard the parties' arguments, DeFunis had registered for
his final term. The Court was assured that DeFunis would be allowed to remain a student
for the balance of any term for which he was enrolled. Id. at 1705-06.
Id. at 1707.
Since [DeFunis] has now registered for his final term, it is evident that he will be
given an opportunity to complete all academic and other requirements for graduation,
and, if he does so, will receive his diploma regardless of any decision this Court might
reach on the merits of this case .... The controversy between the parties has thus
clearly ceased to be "definite and concrete" and no longer "touch[es] the legal rela-
tions of parties having adverse legal interests."
Id. at 1706 (citations omitted).
IS Justice Brennan dissented on the issue of mootness, noting:
I can thus find no justification for the Court's straining to rid itself of this dispute.
While we must be vigilant to require that litigants maintain a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy to assure that "the questions will be framed with the neces-
sary specificity, that the issue will be contested with the necessity [sic] adverseness
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION PROBLEMS
decision, the issue of reverse discrimination will almost certainly present
itself again" and its merits will then have to be considered. Therefore, it
is by no means a frivolous exercise to examine the status of the reverse
discrimination controversy left unresolved in DeFunis.
Three theories for handling the problem were espoused during the
course of the litigation. The state superior court invalidated the admissions
program on the ground that the Constitution mandated similar treatment
for all races. 7 Consequently, affirmative action, using racial classifications
to remedy past discrimination, would appear violative of this dictate. The
Washington Supreme Court, adopting a different approach to the equal
protection considerations, reversed the lower court's holding."8 Though
finding the racial classification to be suspect, the court felt a compelling
state interest, viz., the need for minority lawyers, warranted the use of the
school's admissions program. Finally, a more moderate approach was sug-
gested by Justice Douglas' dissent in the United States Supreme Court. 9
He believed racial classifications could be employed to equalize qualifica-
tion standards but found it impermissible to allow preferential treatment
for members of one race over better qualified members of another."
The following discussion will analyze each of the aforementioned theo-
ries. The justifications for each approach, as well as the weaknesses inher-
ent therein, will be set forth. In any such analysis, it must be kept in mind
that legal considerations cannot be divested of their social impact. Indeed,
establishing a workable solution to the present dilemma "is a task which
is characteristic of important social problems both in its ease of description
and in its resistance to solution."12 '
THE FACTUAL SETTING IN DeFunis
It is essential to note that the basic program under attack was not
employed solely by the Washington Law School. On the contrary, since the
mid-1960's, such admissions policies have been increasingly utilized by
institutions of higher education. A recent study indicated that the vast
and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the
constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of
judicial resolution," . . . there is no want of an adversary contest in this case ....
The case is thus ripe for decision on a fully developed factual record with sharply
defined and fully canvassed legal issues.
Id. at 1722 (footnotes ommitted).
11 See Kohn, N. Y U. Law Faces a 'DeFunis' Suit, 172 N.Y.L.J. 64, Sept. 30, 1974, at 1, col.
3.
'7 DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. Kings County, Sept. 22, 1971).
Is DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973).
" DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
e Id.
21 Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism and Permissible Classification by Race, 67
MICH. L. REv. 1553 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vieira].
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majority of accredited law schools have adopted special programs aimed
at increasing minority enrollment." As the use of special admissions cri-
teria has expanded, such programs have become increasingly vulnerable
to attack. The ineluctable challenge finally materialized when a charge of
reverse discrimination was leveled against the Washington Law School.,
Marco DeFunis, a white University of Washington graduate, was re-
fused admission to the law school for the term commencing September,
1971. Upon discovering that of the 44 minority students accepted, 36 had
lower grades and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores than his
own,"4 DeFunis brought suit in the state superior court. His primary con-
tention was that the law school maintained a dual set of admissions stan-
dards, viz., one for minority students, and another for the remaining appli-
cants. He argued that this classification deprived him of equal protection
of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.2
In recent years, the number of individuals seeking admission to law
schools has increased significantly." That the Washington Law School has
not escaped this influx is evident from the fact that within the brief span
of four years, 1967 to 1971, the number of applications it received rose from
618 to 1601.27 Though the number of people desiring to enter the school had
grown, the number of available seats had not risen proportionately. Thus,
the law school had only 150 seats available for its entering class of 1971.25
Since most of the applicants would have been considered qualified under
prior standards,"9 the process of elimination was most difficult.
To allocate the available openings among the vastly disproportionate
number of applicants, the Committee on Admissions developed certain
standardized criteria. Initially, a Predicted First-Year Average (PFYA)
was calculated for each applicant. By use of a formula which combined an
" See EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL OPPORTUNITIES FOR
MINORITY STUDENTS 30-44 (5th ed. 1973-74). The survey indicated that of the 122 accredited
law schools examined, the 104 employed an active recruiting program which involved special
minority admissions procedures. For a thorough and informative examination of many as-
pects of minority admissions programs, see Symposium - Minority Admission Programs, 2
U. TOL. L. REV. 277 (1970).
13 DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. Kings County, Sept. 22, 1971).
2, DeFunis had a junior-senior grade point average of 3.71 out of a possible 4.0 and an average
LSAT score of 582.
25 82 Wash. 2d. at __, 507 P.2d at 1178.
21 The Association of American Law Schools estimates that approximately 82,000 persons
completed law school applications in 1973. The total number of applicants permitted to enroll
was 37,018. Brief for Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at 3, DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
82 Wash. 2d at -, 507 P.2d at 1172.
nId.
21 The Association of American Law Schools indicated that of the 82,000 applicants to law
schools in 1973, "70,000 would be considered qualified in terms of quantitative predictors of
success in law school." Brief for Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at
3, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1804 (1974).
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applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and LSAT scores,
his first year law school average could be estimated. 31 These preliminary
rankings allowed for an initial categorization of all applications. Once the
PFYA for each applicant was established, however, the treatment of non-
minority and minority applicants differed considerably.
Several hundred applications yielding the lowest predicted averages
in the nonminority group were rejected unless the committee chairman
found something in the applicant's file warranting additional considera-
tion. The practical effect of this process was elimination of most nonminor-
ity applicants with PFYA's below 74.5. Those candidates with PFYA's
above 77 were reviewed by the entire committee as their applications were
received. These applicants were considered most promising and generally
were admitted after one committee member conducted a thorough review
of each file and presented his findings to the others. The remaining group
of candidates, i.e., those with PFYA's between 74.5 and 77, were held in
abeyance until the deadline for applications had passed. Marco DeFunis'
PFYA of 76.23 placed him in the latter category. Eventually, these appli-
cants, along with those with PFYA's below 74.5 whom the chairman felt
merited further attention, and a small number with PFYA's above 77
about whom there was some question upon initial consideration, were di-
vided among the seven members of the admissions committee.3' The full
committee then met to hear and vote on the recommendations submitted
by these individual members.3
Minority applicants were treated in a significantly different fashion."
" See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1708 n.1 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
31 Chief Justice Hale of the Washington Supreme Court noted that: "[elach member of the
committee, including student members, was given approximately 70 files upon which to make
recommendations for admission or rejection .... " DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11,
-, 507 P.2d 1169, 1193 (1973) (dissenting opinion). He cited this as one example of the
arbitrariness of the school's policy.
31 Id. at -, 507 P.2d at 1173-74.
u Not every minority group was given special consideration. The school decided that only
Black Americans, Chicano Americans, American Indians, and Phillipine Americans were to
be given extra attention. This particular aspect of its program received a great deal of criti-
cism. There were no specific reasons advanced by the school for the choices it made. However,
the law school did explain that, in its opinion, Oriental Americans were not in need of
assistance since they were more than proportionately represented in the school when com-
pared with the overall population of the area. This rationale loses much of its argumentative
value when it is observed that blacks made up 2.2% of the student body while 2.1% of the
Washington population was black. Justice Douglas observed this statistic and later chided:
The argument is that a "compelling" state interest can easily justify the racial discrim-
ination that is practiced here. To many "compelling" would give members of one race
even more than pro rata representation.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1718 (1974) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
Additionally, the only method used in determining whether a particular applicant was a
member of the preferred minority group was to look at whether he had checked the appropri-
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Particular attention was paid to the non-quantitative factors of their appli-
cations and the "applicant's racial or ethnic background was considered
as one factor in [the] general attempt to convert formal credentials into
realistic predictions."u Unlike the nonminority applicants, no minority
candidates, regardless of their PFYA's were initially considered by the
committee chairman for summary rejection. Additionally, treatment of
minority applicants varied as to the distribution of files among committee
members. Instead of a random procedure, each minority applicant's file
was assigned to a currently enrolled minority student and to the faculty
member who had been involved in a special summer program for potential
law students from disadvantaged backgrounds." The remaining minority
candidates were assigned to the assistant dean. The recommendations of
these members were reviewed by the full committee for final determina-
tion. At no time were minority applicants compared with nonminority
candidates.
As a result of the overall admissions process, 275 letters of acceptance
were mailed, of which 44 were sent to minority candidates. 6 Normal attri-
tion among the chosen group of 275 was expected to reduce the number to
the desired 150. 31 A waiting list was established which classified the re-
maining applicants into one of four quartiles. DeFunis was placed in the
fourth or lowest category. This precarious position on the waiting list left
DeFunis among the most vulnerable and, as expected, he received his
letter of rejection in August. Of the eventual 150 students in the entering
class of 1971, 18 were members of a minority group. 38
PERMISSIBILITY OF MINORITY CONSCIOUSNESS IN ADMISSIONS CLASSIFICATIONS
The Washington Superior Court's Rationale
DeFunis' attack upon the admissions policy of the law school pre-
sented the state superior court with several issues. Specifically, plaintiff
questioned the use of LSAT scores where an applicant's GPA was ex-
tremely high. He objected to the school's method of averaging his three
LSAT scores in predicting his first year average and urged that only his
last, and highest, score should have been employed in the calculation."
ate box on his application. This was cited as extremely arbitrary by the dissenter in the
Washington Supreme Court, 82 Wash. 2d at -, 507 P.2d at 1189, and by Justice Douglas.
94 S. Ct. at 1708.
31 82 Wash. 2d at __, 507 P.2d at 1174. The law school explained this procedure in its Guide
for Applicants, a copy of which was sent to all who applied for admission.
3 The University of Washington conducted a "summer enrichment" program for its minority
candidates in 1971, through the Council on Legal Education Opportunities (CLEO), a feder-
ally funded program instituted in 1968. Id. at -, 507 P.2d at 1175.
3, 82 Wash. 2d at __, 507 P.2d at 1176.
37 Id.
38 Id.
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION PROBLEMS
Pointing to the presence of students on the admissions committee and to
the use of non-numerical standards, he argued that the program involved
an arbitrary process exceeding the discretionary power of school authori-
ties. 0 DeFunis further contended that residents of the State of Washington
should be given preference over non-residents. Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the court was asked to decide whether the school's minority pro-
gram constituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment."
The University, in defending its policies, urged that the state had
vested the responsibility for decisions on admissions in the University
Board of Regents, 2 which had legally transferred that authority to the law
school faculty. The courts, it claimed, had no right to interfere with the
exercise of discretion inherent in admissions decisions. Futhermore, the
school took exception to DeFunis' contention that the PFYA was the only
proper criterion to be employed in admissions decisions. The calculation
of the PFYA, it argued, was merely a necessary preliminary step in the
entire process of admissions. In response to plaintiff's fourteenth amend-
ment argument, the school asserted that its minority program was a form
of "benign discrimination" 3 aimed at a legitimate and justifiable purpose
"' DeFunis took the LSAT three times. The first time he received a score of 512, the second
time he advanced to 566, and the third time he scored 668. Id. at -, 507 P.2d at 1173. The
average of these grades, 582, was used by the School in calculating DeFunis' PFYA. The
purpose of averaging the three scores was explained by the Washington Supreme Court:
If an applicant has taken the LSAT more than once in the past 3 years, the average
score is employed rather than the latest score; this is done to offset a learning effect
which statistical studies by the Educational Testing Service indicates [sic] occurs as
the result of the multiple taking of the test.
Id.
40 Id. at -, 507 P.2d at 1185.
Chief Justice Hale of the Washington Supreme Court considered the presence of students
on the committee a most disturbing factor. In his dissent, he stated:
Although each of the two law student members possessed full voting powers and served
with exactly the same authority as each of the five faculty members, the record is
devoid of any standards applied as basis for their appointment to the committee on
admissions.
Id. at -, 507 P.2d at 1193.
" Id. at -, 507 P.2d at 1177.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
42 See WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.20.130(B) (1970).
' Classifications aimed at implementing "programs which attempt to redress the effects of
past racial discrimination by giving special treatment to particular racial groups . . . have
become known as 'benign racial classifications.'" Note, Developments in the Law - Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1104-05 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the
Law].
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and, therefore, did not violate the equal protection clause."
All of DeFunis' contentions were eventually dismissed with the excep-
tion of his claim based upon the equal protection clause.A After acknowl-
edging the school's meritorious intentions, Judge Shorett nonetheless felt
the minority enrollment program wielded a double-edged sword. In his
opinion, the majority of those admitted under this policy were less quali-
fied than the plaintiff and others similarly situated. Concentrating entirely
on numerical indicia, he stated:
[S]ome minority students were admitted whose college and aptitude test
scores were so low that had they been whites, their applications would have
been summarily denied."
Thus, DeFunis was found to have been denied the equal protection of the
law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Judge Shorett concluded
that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'7 was
controlling, and noted:
After that decision, the Fourteenth amendment could no longer be stretched
to accomodate the needs of any race. Policies of discrimination will inevitably
lead to reprisals. In my opinion the only safe rule is to treat all races alike
and I feel that is what is required under the equal protection clause.0
Consequently the school was ordered to admit DeFunis.
The Color-Blind Constitution Doctrine
Essentially, Judge Shorett was declaring that the Supreme Court, in
Brown, not only overruled the Plessy v. Ferguson" doctrine of separate but
equal, but also adopted a literal interpretation of Justice Harlan's dissent
therein. Justice Harlan had noted:
Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law. ....
This phrase has often been cited by opponents of affirmative action pro-
grams to support their contention that racial classifications are per se
unconstitutional. It is clear, however, that Justice Harlan was addressing
" As noted by Charles E. Odegaard, President of the University of Washington:
The fundamental purpose of the university's affirmative action program in admissions
is to fulfill the obligation called for by the Fourteenth Amendment by providing equal
educational access to all, including those who have been educationally disadvantaged.
57 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1971).
'1 DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. Kings County, Sept. 22, 1971).
46 Id.
47 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41 DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. Kings County, Sept. 22, 1971).
41 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION PROBLEMS
himself to the problems of blacks as a group and, more particularly, to the
white supremacists who were responsible for the problems." He believed
that the majority decision in Plessy would perpetuate racial discrimina-
tion. When his lone dissent was finally heeded in 1954, discrimination had,
indeed, become thoroughly entrenched in American society. In light of the
continued presence of the discrimination problem, therefore, it is arguable
that Justice Harlan would not oppose the use of racial classifications to
correct that which he could not prevent.
The language of the Brown Court was directed explicitly at the evils
of school segregation. The decision did not involve affirmative action pro-
grams seeking to remedy past racial discrimination. Looking beyond
Brown, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Court did not intend
race to be excluded from consideration in all classification schemes. In
fact, the Court, in Bolling v. Sharpe,52 reiterated the policy of viewing
racial classifications as suspect, thus refusing to take the further step of
holding them unconstitutional per se. This is not without significance,
especially since the "color-blind" concept was an available option which
the Court chose to disregard. Thus, important questions with regard to the
use of racial classifications seem best directed to their limits, not their
plausibility.
Judicial Implementation of Minority Consciousness
Whether the Brown decision was intended to preclude the use of racial
3' This is evident when the entire statement is examined:
The white races deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it
will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to
the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eyes of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There
is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect to civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.
Id.
52 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
The court in Bolling stated:
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.
Id. at 499 (footnote omitted); accord, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
wherein the Court commented:
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny.
Id. at 216. See Gegan, De Jure Integration in Education, 11 CAm. LAw 4, 12 (1965), wherein
the author states that "[tihere is no purpose to a 'rigid scrutiny' unless there are cases that
might survive it." See generally Tussman & tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALF.
L. REv. 341 (1949). See also Lange & Polak, Equal Protection and Benign Racial Classifica-
tions: A Challenge to the Law Schools, 21 AM. U. L. Rv. 736, 742 (1972).
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classifications under all circumstances is, concededly, debatable. What is
certain, however, is the judicial interpretation which Brown has received
over the past twenty years. As the Washington Supreme Court observed
in reversing the trial court: "[A] racial criterion may be used-and
indeed in some circumstances must be used-by public educational insti-
tutions in bringing about racial balance.""
School Desegregation Utilizing Racial Classifications
Courts, in their attacks upon de jure segregation in public schools,
have consistently deemed racial consciousness to be an appropriate reme-
dial posture.5 Logically, if school authorities are constitutionally forbidden
from instituting segregated school systems, they should be equally forbid-
den from perpetuating such systems by ignoring racial considerations. The
Fourth Circuit applied this reasoning in Wanner v. School Board" to per-
mit a local board to change artificial boundary lines that had been con-
trived to insure segregation. The court therein stated:
When school authorities, recognizing the historic fact that existing conditions
are based on a design to segregate the races, act to undo these illegal condi-
tions . . . their effort is not to be frustrated on the ground that race is not a
permissible consideration. This is not the "consideration of race" which the
Constitution discountenances11
Of particular significance is Swann v. Board of Education," wherein
the Supreme Court allowed school authorities to consider race as a valid
criterion in determining the composition of individual schools. The color-
blind interpretation of Brown was rejected, and the Court held that the
Constitution may be construed in a color conscious manner in order to
undo the effects of past segregation and prevent its perpetuation. The
opinion is particularly appropriate to DeFunis not only with regard to
racial consciousness but also for its suggestions as to the extent of the
discretionary powers of school authorities:
82 Wash. 2d at __, 507 P.2d at 1179 (emphasis in original).
55 See, e.g., Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Alexander v. Homes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d
385 (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Kelly v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ.,
317 F. Supp. 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1970). See generally Avins, De Facto and De Jure School
Segregation: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment From the Civil Rights Act
of 1875, 38 Miss. L.J. 179 (1967).
N 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966).
'7 Id. at 454. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
[I]f [racial classifications] are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary
to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.
Id. at 11; accord, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
- 402 U. S. 1 (1971).
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School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate
and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example,
that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the
proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is
within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities . . . .B
On the same day the Swann decision was handed down, the Court
invalidated North Carolina's anti-busing law, which proscribed the use of
race as a means to establish racial balance in public school.1 While so
acting, the Court expressly clarified the intent of the Brown mandate:
[T]he statute exploits an apparently neutral form to control school assign-
ment plans by directing that they be "color blind"; that requirement, against
the background of segregation, would render illusory the promise of Brown
v. Board of Education. . . . Just as the race of students must be considered
in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must
race be considered in formulating a remedy.6 '
Even in cases of de facto segregation, courts have often allowed local
school boards discretionary power to initiate remedial policies. Though
they generally avoid ordering specific ameliorative steps,"2 courts have re-
11 Id. at 16; accord, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In United States v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969), the district court had set a ratio of
two blacks for every twelve teachers in a school. Rejecting this "fixed mathematics," the
court of appeals modified the order and replaced it with an initial requirement of "substan-
tially or approximately" a one-to-five ratio. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
district court order because it promised to work now.
" North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
, Id. at 45-46; accord, United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 385 (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
12 See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 847 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924
(1964). But see Springfield School Comm'n v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Hobson
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub noma., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
Compare Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), with Milliken v. Bradley, 42
U.S.L.W. 5249 (U.S. July 25, 1974). In Keyes, the Supreme Court appeared to be taking a
harder line toward de facto segregation. It ruled that a finding of de jure segregation within
a "meaningful portion" of a school system created a presumption of unconstitutional segrega-
tion in the rest. However, in the recent Milliken decision, the Court appears to have moved
in the other direction. The Court reversed and remanded a lower court order requiring an
inter-district remedy for school segregation. Chief Justice Burger stated:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside
by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-
district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation
within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district.
Specifically it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local
school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of inter-
district segregation. Thus an inter-district remedy might be in order where the racially
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fused to enjoin school boards from taking such action to remedy segrega-
tion resulting from residential patterns1 For example, the Second Circuit,
in Offermann v. Nitkowski," held that although no constitutional duty to
undo de facto segregation rested upon local school boards, to so act was
not unconstitutional. The court commented that when racial considera-
tions are employed in achieving equal educational opportunity, "we cannot
conceive that our courts would find that the state denied equal protection
to either race by requiring its school boards to act with awareness of the
problem." 5
In light of the aforementioned decisions, the superior court's conclu-
sion in DeFunis that the color-blind approach is the only safe path to follow
would seem unwarranted." DeFunis, however, raised a more sensitive issue
than that involved in school desegregation. 7 Clearly, no one is deprived of
an education through the institution of school integration procedures. The
goals sought to be attained are equality of education and diversification
of the student body. No one would contend that one race is being preferred
over the other. This, however, is not the case where law school admissions
are concerned. Although DeFunis was accepted by four other law schools,"
it is conceivable that the policies practiced by the Washington school could
have resulted in the absolute denial of a legal education to another nonmi-
discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an
adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of
race. In such circumstances an inter-district remedy would be appropriate to eliminate
the inter-district segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. Con-
versely, without an inter-district violation and inter-district effect, there is no constitu-
tional wrong calling for an inter-district remedy.
Id. at 5258. For a detailed discussion of Keyes, see Note, Toward the Elimination of DeFacto
Segregation in Public Schools, 20 CATk. LAW. 60 (1974).
11 See Wanner v. County School Bd., 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of
Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Balaban v. Rubin, 14
N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964). See generally
O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher
Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 715 (1971).
378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id. at 24-25.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Wash. Super. Ct. Kings County, Sept. 22, 1971).
'7 Even those who support preferential admissions policies have raised the issue of reverse
discrimination as possibly too great a sacrifice for the white majority. See, e.g., Hughes,
Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1063 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hughes]. While
Professor Hughes recognizes the need for sacrifices in eliminating the substandard conditions
of blacks in this country, he adds:
The cost must of course be minimized and nobody should be asked to bear too heavy
a burden of sacrifice. If one white student were to be denied a college education at all,
the sacrifice would be too great reasonably to be imposed.
Id. at 1072.
DeFunis could have pursued legal studies at the University of Idaho, the University of
Oregon, Gonzaga University or Williamette University. 82 Wash. 2d at__, 507 P.2d at 1181
n.11.
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nority student. Therefore, the classification, though ameliorative in intent,
would not be "benign" to such an individual. This important distinction
comprises the heart of the present controversy. Although the school deseg-
regation cases establish the permissibility of minority consciousness, they
do not dispose of the crucial issue of reverse discrimination in the present
context.
Minority Consciousness in Employment Programs
The closest analogy to preferential admissions policies may be found
in the affirmative action programs affecting labor unions and employment
practices. In this area, Carter v. Gallagher" provides an insight into both
the problems facing a court and the various solutions that may be reached
where allegations of reverse discrimination are encountered. In Carter the
district court found the hiring procedures employed by the Minneapolis
Fire Department to be blatantly discriminatory."0 Statistical evidence re-
vealed that although blacks comprised 6.44 percent of the population in
Minneapolis, none of the 535 men in the department were black.7 Conse-
quently, the fire department was ordered to institute changes in its testing
procedures designed to eliminate discriminatory hiring practices. Further-
more, the court, noting that immediate measures were required to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination, imposed a limited minority pref-
erence scheme. The order mandated that the department hire twenty mi-
nority persons who met the revised qualification standards."
" 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
70 452 F.2d at 323.
71 Id.
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have frequently relied upon
statistical evidence to prove a violation .... In many cases the only available avenue
of proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination
by the employer or union involved.
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
in determining whether an employer had invalidly excluded a particular person or group from
employment, statistics could be utilized as proof of a discriminatory pattern. See Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U.
Cmi. L. Rxv. 235 (1971).
72 452 F.2d at 318.
When a court has determined that a violation of Title VII has occurred, it is vested
with broad remedial power to remove the vestiges of past discrimination and to elimi-
nate and prevent both present and future barriers 'to the full enjoyment of equal job
opportunities by qualified black workers.'
United States v. Local 212, Electrical Workers, 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1973), quoting
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971); accord, Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970);
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Defendants appealed, -contending that the order violated the four-
teenth amendment. 73 They argued that in allocating the minority positions
as required, an employer would be compelled to discriminate against white
applicants possessing superior comparative qualifications. It was further
claimed that "upon the basis of approved and acceptable job related tests
and standards, '"7' whites would be entitled to priority "but for the minority
preference requirement . . . . "
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concurred with the find-
ings of the district courf as to previous discrimination." However, the
absolute preference was ruled unconstitutional on the ground that prior
discriminatory policies could not justify the present racial discrimination
against better qualified nonminority applicants." In so holding, the court
relied upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,18 believing that the Supreme Court
therein had set the limits on affirmative action in employment practices.
The Griggs Court had stated:
Congress did not intend by Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ...
to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the
Act does command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly
the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.
Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely
and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when




United States ex. rel. Mitchell v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1968); cf. Swann
v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
11 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 324 (8th Cir. 1971).
7, Id. at 324.
7I Id.
71 Id. at 326.
n The court stated:
The fact that some unnamed and unknown White person in the distant past may, by
reason of past racial discrimination in which the present applicant in no way partici-
pated, have received preference over some unidentified minority person with higher
qualifications is no justification for discriminating against the present better qualified
applicant upon the basis of race.
Id. at 325.
79 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11 Id. at 430-31. This language by the Court is closely paralleled by the anti-preference
provision Section 703(j) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. That section provides that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject
to this title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because
of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer,
referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization,
admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or
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employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the
total number of [sic] percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(j) (1970).
On appeal in Carter, the Eighth Circuit, en banc, dealt with the three-judge panel's
reliance on Griggs and with § 703(j) as if they presented the same arguments against the
percentage goals instituted by the district court. The court noted that its concern in the
present case was with "§ 1981 of the old Civil Rights Act and the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 452 F.2d at 329. Therefore, § 703(0) was deemed inapplicable. Still, the court
commented that "even the anti-preference treatment section of the new Civil Rights Act of
1964 does not limit the power of a court to order affirmative relief to correct the effects of
past unlawful practices." Id.
The various circuits have consistently rejected attacks on district court orders founded
upon the anti-preference provision. In United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th
Cir. 1970), the Sixth Circuit held:
When the stated purposes of the Act and the broad affirmative relief authorization.
[42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6] are read in context with § 2000e-2(j), we believe that section
cannot be construed as a ban on affirmative relief against continuation. . . resulting
from present practices (neutral on their face) which have the practical effect of con-
tinuing past injustices.
Any other interpretation would allow complete nullification of the stated purposes
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
428 F.2d at 149-50. See United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 554 (9th Cir.
1971) ("The district court neither abused its discretion in ordering the affirmative relief, nor
did it in any way establish a system of 'racial quotas' or 'preferences' in violation of section
703(j)."); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1055 (5th Cir. 1969) (district
court held to have done "no more than ensure that the injunction against further racial
discrimination would be fairly administered."). Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler,
490 F.2d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3594 (Apr. 22, 1974), wherein Chief
Judge Coffin, relying upon cases rejecting § 703(j) attacks, dismissed a contention that an
analogous Massachusetts provision proscribed a requirement of specific minority preference
in the construction trade.
See generally Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three
Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RurERs L. REv. 675, 692 (1974), wherein Professor
Blumrosen observes:
The political realities are that Section 703(1), and other qualifying provisos of Title VII,
were inserted to satisfy those who were concerned with statutory overkill. But each
such qualifying clause contains its own internal compromise which restricts its impact
where discrimination is found. Thus the most that can be said is that section 703()
stands against the proposition that employment opportunities are to be allocated
throughout the nation by reference to race, color, or sex. It does not address the
question of the use of a numerical standard as a remedy for discriminatory hiring
practices unless the remedy were to produce the proscribed mechanical allocation
I believe that the actions of Congress in 1972, in rejecting proposed amendments
to Title VII which would have prohibited 'discrimination in reverse' and made section
703(j) applicable to the executive order, confirm the view that Congress intended to
permit effective affirmative action remedies where discrimination was found, including
the use of numerical standards under the conditions described here.
(footnotes omitted). The Congressional debates to which Professor Blumrosen refers appear
in 118 CONG. Rac. 691-706, 2275-76 (1972).
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Upon rehearing en banc in Carter,80 the question of the appropriate
remedy was the only real issue. Although the ban on a hiring quota was
vacated, the district court's absolute preference scheme was not adopted.
The full court believed a solution could best be found in a balancing of the
two previous decisions. Two considerations had to be reconciled - 1) the
possibility resulting from an absolute preference, of a present infringe-
ment upon the rights of nonminority applicants either equally or better
qualified, and 2) the legitimate goal of eradicating the present effects of
past discrimination. The court resolved the conflict by imposing a ratio for
hiring based upon the racial composition of the population of the area.8 '
It ordered that one of every three new employees should be a minority
person, until twenty were hired.82 Thereafter, hiring was to be conducted
purely on the basis of superior qualifications."
The Seventh and Third Circuits have also permitted the use of mini-
mum ratios based on race to achieve greater equal employment opportun-
ity. 4 On each occasion, the courts were asked to rule on the validity of a
,0 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 327 (8th Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 330.
82 The court noted:
While some of the remedial orders relied on by the plaintiffs and the Government
ordered one to one ratios, they appear to be in areas and occupations with a more
substantial minority population than the Minneapolis area. Thus we conclude that a
a one to two ratio would be appropriate here, until 20 qualified minority persons have
been hired.
Id. at 331.
In Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit
faced a similar problem to the one involved in Carter. Upon finding that the New York City
examination for fire-fighters resulted in disproportionate representation of blacks and His-
panics in the fire department, the district court invalidated the testing procedure. It ordered
the institution of a job-related exam and later promulgated a hiring ratio of three whites to
one minority person until all minority individuals of the eligibility list had been hired. The
court of appeals affirmed, stating:
It is quite true that the judge's 3:1 ratio does not purport to rest on any scientific basis.
But neither does the plaintiffs' proposal, and the intervenors' figure does not take
account of factors the judge was permitted to consider. In arriving at a ratio midway
between what would have been appropriate on the basis of correcting the inequities of
Exam 0159 alone and the plaintiffs' demands for much more extensive relief, the judge
took appropriate account both of the resentment of non-minority individuals against
quotas of any sort and of the need of getting started to redress past wrongs.
Id. at 398-99.
, The court justified its decision by noting:
Such a procedure does not constitute a 'quota' system because as soon as the trial
court's order is fully implemented, all hirings will be on a racially non-discriminatory
basis, and it could well be that many more minority persons or less, as compared to
the population at large, over a long period of time would apply and qualify for the
positions.
452 F.2d at 330-31.
" See Southern Illinois Builder's Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors
Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
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plan initiated under the authority of Executive Order 112 4 6.u The order,
designed to promote equal opportunity in federal employment, contained
a provision requiring construction contractors, bidding on any federal or
federally assisted construction contract to take affirmative steps toward
ensuring that no discrimination was practiced in their hiring and promo-
tion procedures.88 The Secretary of Labor, authorized to establish all ap-
propriate implementation guidelines, adopted regulations demanding spe-
cific goals of minority manpower utilization. 7
As a result of these regulations, the Department of Labor issued an
order barring the use of additional federal funds in highway construction
in certain areas of Illinois. The Department had determined that the re-
quired equal employment opportunity did not exist for minority workers.
To remedy this situation, an affirmative action program, the Ogilvie Plan,
was promulgated by the governor of Illinois." Directed at the recruitment,
placement, and training of minority group members in the highway con-
struction industry, the plan established the position of "advanced trainee"
for all minority applicants lacking the skills of a journeyman. A minimum
Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974).
U Id. at 170.
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1974). The gross underrepresentation of minority groups in the
construction industry is an established fact. See Hill, Racial Practices of Organized Labor:
The Contemporary Record, in THE NEGRO AND THE AMERCAN LABOR MovmENT 313-14 (J.
Jacobson ed. 1968). Unions have restricted their membership and have thus been the main
factor in limiting access of racial minorities. See Hearings on Employment and Manpower
Problems in the Cities: Implications of the Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders Before the Joint Economic Com., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 38 (1968). To combat
this situation, the regulations, promulgated in 1968, demand that contractors adopt affirma-
tive action plans which
provide in detail for specific steps to guarantee equal employment opportunity keyed
to the problems and needs of members of minority groups, including, when there are
deficiencies, the development of specific goals and time tables for the prompt achieve-
ment of full and equal employment opportunity.
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1974).
Since the appearance of the two pilot affirmative action plans created pursuant to the
regulations-the Cleveland and Philadelphia Plans-there have been numerous "hometown"
plans developed. Once such a plan is approved by the Secretary of Labor, programs adopting
the plan are then eligible for federal funds and cooperative contractors involved meet the
requirements of Executive Order 11246. Many of these plans have been challenged in the
courts but most have fared well. See, e.g., Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970)
(validating Newark plan); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35,
249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970) (validating Cleveland plan).
89 On June 3, 1970, following the order of the United States Department of Transportation
to withhold highway construction funds from Madison and St. Clair Counties due to lack of
equal employment opportunites, the governor established "An Agreement to Facilitate Equal
Employment Opportunity in Madison and St. Clair Counties." (Ogilvie Plan). The plan was
instituted in order to conform to the guidelines of Executive Order No. 11246. See Southern
Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Nash,
Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 225 (1971).
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ratio of one advanced trainee to four journeymen was required for each
craft.
The unions' challenge to the institution of these measures was rejected
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Southern Illinois Builder's
Association v. Ogilvie." The court therein observed that minority member-
ship in the highway construction industry was minimal due to gross under-
representation in construction unions. Before the introduction of these
corrective measures, there had been no pretense that minorities could not
qualify for positions. They were simply denied admission to labor unions.
Since contractors relied upon the unions for manpower referral, the unions
were able to perpetuate discriminatory practices. While there was no sim-
ple solution, the need to eradicate this injustice was overpowering.
Here, as in Carter, the use of the ratio was viewed as an essential
means of satisfying the obligation to take affirmative action."0 It was seen
as a necessary step to encourage victims of previous discrimination to seek
employment under the present standards. The plan validly attempted to
eliminate the self-perpetuating process of exclusion of minority manpower.
As such, the court felt that the plan did not "impermissibly prefer black
persons nor [did] it discriminate against white persons ... ""
Both the Carter and Ogilvie courts cited Contractors Association v.
Secretary of Labor2 in support of their holdings. Contractors, like Ogilvie,
involved a plan promulgated under Executive Order 11246. The "Philadel-
phia Plan," created by order of the Department of Labor, obligated con-
struction contractors in the Philadelphia area to submit an affirmative
action program with all bids on federal contracts. The plan's validity was
challenged by several contractors.93
The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that the plan unconstitutionally
compelled them to classify by race and refuse to hire some white persons,
terming this contention an oversimplification. It found that the order was
designed to deal with the fact that minorities were flagrantly underrepre-
sented in key trades because of union discrimination. The Executive Order
91 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'g, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
10 As stated by Judge Poos in the district court:
[Tihere is no infallible and certain formula which will erase decades of history and
alter a distasteful set of circumstances into a utopian atmosphere .... Basic self-
interests of the individual must be balanced with social interests, and in circumstances
where blacks have been discriminated against for years, there is no alternative but to
require that certain minorities be taken into consideration with respect to the specific
minority percentage of the population in a given area in order to provide a starting
point for equal employment opportunities.
327 F. Supp. at 1159.
1 471 F.2d at 686.
" 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
'1 The contractors maintained that the plan violated their due process rights since the unions
are responsible for the underrepresentation and, therefore, should be required to remedy the
problem. Id. at 174.
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was felt to demand more than a mere freezing of the status quo; rather, it
mandated remedial action. Consequently, the court viewed the plan as an
acceptable use of color consciousness involving no reverse discrimination."
The minority manpower goals could be achieved "without adverse effects
on the existing labor force."" As in Ogilvie, no white person would be
displaced as a result of the plan's implementation.
At first glance, the aforementioned decisions would appear to support
the law school admissions policy in DeFunis. There are additional factors
however, that must be considered before substantial reliance is placed
upon these holdings. Not the least of these considerations is the fact that
the Supreme Court has never passed upon the validity of any of the pro-
grams at issue in the above controversies. In fact, the closest step taken
by the Court in the area of employment discrimination falls short of de-
manding specific goal-oriented action and arguably supports the no-
preference viewpoint." More importantly, however, the employment af-
firmative action cases can be distinguished on several substantive grounds.
First, the use of employment ratios was viewed merely as a temporary
solution. Minority preference hiring, as in Carter, would not be required
once the process of testing had been corrected to eliminate any racial bias
and geared toward job-related problems. The program developed by the
Washington Law School presented no corresponding remedy. Signifi-
cantly, the preference apparently would continue indefinitely since the
school made no attempt to determine whether its usual admissions process
was defective." Secondly, it was recognized in most of the employment
4 Clearly the Philadelphia Plan is color-conscious. Indeed the only meaning which can
be attributed to the 'affirmative action' language which since March of 1961 has been
included in successive Executive Orders is that Government contractors must be color-
conscious.
Id. at 173.
11 Id. at 176. The court was convinced "that the specific goals may be met, considering normal
employee attrition and anticipated growth in the industry, without adverse effects on the
existing labor force." Id.
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), discussed in text accompanying notes
78-79 supra.
" The interim nature of measures taken to correct minority underrepresentation in the em-
ployment area is a positive feature which lends support to affirmative action advocates. Once
it has been established that the tests utilized in the hiring process are designed to exclude
minorities, they can be replaced by job-related examinations. In most cases, this will place
minorities on an equal footing with their white counterparts and the source of the imbalance
will have been eliminated.
In the case of preferential admissions policies, as advanced by the Washington Law
School, the corrective measures, if condoned by the Court, will necessarily operate over a
longer period of time since the equalizing process would require corresponding changes at
lower rungs of the educational ladder. If one concedes that minority groups are subjected to
educational disadvantage throughout their academic careers, a preference accorded at the
graduate or professional level does nothing to reach the problem at its roots. Thus, there may
appear to be no end to the use of a preference, a fact that clearly diminishes its desirability.
If, however, cultural bias in the admissions process is the real source of underrepre-
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cases that, although the tests utilized in the industry could determine the
presence or absence of basic qualifications, they might not be able to rank
"qualified applicants with precision, statistical validity, and predictive
significance."' 8 Thus, there was no proof that minority members hired
under any of these plans were less qualified than whites. In DeFunis,
however, the school itself admitted that its policy resulted in the accept-
ance of some candidates who were less qualified."
It is readily apparent, therefore, that DeFunis raised the strongest
"reverse discrimination" challenge that the judiciary has thus far faced.
Thus, the remedies fashioned in the desegregation and employment cases
are not directly applicable. However, these decisions leave no doubt as to
the demise of the theory of a color-blind constitution; each of them ad-
vances the proposition that minority consciousness as a means of remedy-
ing the effects of past discrimination should not only be tolerated but
encouraged.
EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
The decisions involving desegregation plans and affirmative action
employment programs set the stage for the Washington Supreme Court's
handling of the issues raised by DeFunis. Clearly, the Washington court
could easily dispute the color-blind concept relied on by Judge Shorett.
This, however, did not dispose of the more crucial issue related to the
limits of racial consciousness. The Washington Supreme Court's thorough
analysis of the equal protection challenge evidences an awareness of the
features that set DeFunis apart from the other cases. Nevertheless, its
conclusions appear to overlook the real novelty of the issues presented.
Standards for Review of Governmental Action
All laws classify in some degree and, to that extent, there will be an
element of inequality in most. Thus, it is apparent that the equal protec-
tion clause does not demand that all individuals be treated equally under
the law in all cases.100 In determining whether or not governmental action
violates the constitutional guarantee, a court must examine the nature of
sentation, then a closer analogy to the temporary ratios of the employment cases is available.
The elimination of the biased examination and substitution of a culturally neutral procedure
would insure that any "preference" would be temporary. Following an initial equalization,
the admissions process could continue without further need of artificial assistance. See text
accompanying notes 142-45 infra.
" Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971).
94 S. Ct. at 1711.
100 It is clear that the demand for equal protection cannot be a demand that laws apply
universally to all persons. The legislature, if it is to act at all, must impose special
burdens upon or grant special benefits to special groups or classes of individuals.
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 343 (1949).
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a particular classification, the individual interests affected by it, and the
governmental interests asserted in support thereof.101 The first of these
three considerations will govern the scope of judicial scrutiny with regard
to the latter two.
Under the traditional equal protection test, the key is reasonable-
ness.'12 The governmental purpose must be proper, and the classification
in question must be rationally related to the achievement of that pur-
pose. 10 3 In applying the traditional test, the Supreme Court has stated: "A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasona-
bly may be conceived to justify it." 0 The character of certain classifica-
tions, however, requires that they be inspected more carefully. If the classi-
fication affects a "fundamental right," 05 or is premised on certain "suspect
101 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968), the Court stated:
[Tihis court has firmly established the principle that the Equal Protection Clause
does not make every minor difference in the application of laws to different groups a
violation of our Constitution. But we have also held many times that 'invidious' dis-
tinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In
determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must
consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the
classification.
Id. at 30; accord, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
725 (1973).
,02 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389
(1928), explained the traditional equal protection standard as follows:
Discrimination through classification is said to violate that clause only where it is such
as 'to preclude the assumption that it was made in the exercise of legislative judgment
and discretion.' In other words, the equality clause requires merely that the classifica-
tion shall be reasonable. We call that action reasonable which an informed, intelligent,
just-minded, civilized man could rationally favor. In passing upon legislation assailed
under the equality clause we have declared that the classification must rest upon a
difference which is real, as distinguished from one which is seeming, specious, or
fanciful, so that all actually situated similarly will be treated alike; that the object of
the classification must be the accomplishment of a purpose or the promotion of a
policy, which is within the permissible functions of the State; and that the difference
must bear a relation to the object of the legislation which is substantial, as distin-
guished from one which is speculative, remote, or negligible.
Id. at 405-06 (citations ommitted).
103 The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause
have been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory
classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972), citing Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe R.R.
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
1*4 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
10 The right to vote, for example, has been deemed a fundamental right. See Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970), the Court stated
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criteria,""' it must be closely scrutinized. Consequently, the reasonable-
ness standard, with its attendant presumption that the state acted ration-
ally, 107 is replaced; a stricter test, requiring the state to show a compelling
interest in perpetuating the classification, is substituted.108
Interestingly, none of the courts that have previously dealt with a
claim of reverse discrimination clearly enunciated which standard was
applicable.'" In fact, while resolving equal protection controversies, these
courts seemed to misplace their emphasis on the disadvantage a person
suffers as a result of a particular classification. In so doing, the main issue
of different treatment of individuals was virtually ignored. The courts went
to great lengths to establish that no whites were injured by the policies
implemented. This led to the conclusion that the equal protection clause
was not violated. However, a mere showing that a classification results in
different treatment for different groups should be sufficient to call into
question its validity under the equal protection clause."' Recognizing this
in confronting Washington Law School's dual admissions procedure, the
Washington Supreme Court directly addressed itself to equal protection
analysis. Its initial task was choosing the applicable standard of review.
Race As a Suspect Criterion
Racial classifications are generally thought to be 'suspect' because through-
out the country's history they have generally been used to discriminate offi-
cially against groups which are politically subordinate and subject to private
prejudice and discrimination."'
Invidious racial classifications - those that stigmatize a racial group with
the stamp of inferiority - have been held unconstitutional because no
compelling interest seemingly existed to justify their use."2 In addition,
that "before th[e] right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the
assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny." See also
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
The right to travel has also been acknowledged as fundamental. See Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), wherein the Court held:
[fln moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercis-
ing a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest, is unconstitutional.
Id. at 634 (emphasis in original).
10 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race).
a See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
'" See cases cited in notes 105 & 106 supra.
'0 See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary
of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
See Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1076.
, Id. at 1107.
112 [Tihe Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifica-
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racial classifications have traditionally been deemed "irrelevant to any
possible public purpose." ' 13 However, when the public purpose is to in-
crease minority representation, and the classification itself appears to be
benign, not invidious, the question arises as to whether the rational basis
test should substitute for the compelling interest standard."' As noted by
Judge J. Skelly Wright, the rational basis standard may be more appropri-
ate under these circumstances.
[Tihe function of equal protection ... is to shield groups or individuals
from stigmatization by government. Whether or not particular legislation
stigmatizes is largely a sociological question requiring consideration of struc-
ture and history of our society as well as examination of the statute itself.
Legislation favoring Negroes, then, would be constitutional because it is
rational and because in our society it would not stigmatize whites."'
Support for this lenient standard of judicial review in reverse discrimi-
nation controversies can be gleaned from an examination of the purpose
of the fourteenth amendment. There can be no doubt that its immediate
goal was to insure equality for former slaves. "E This does not mean that
the principles of the amendment are not universal in their application to
all persons." 7 However, when confronted with claims by the majority race
that programs aimed at fulfilling the original mandate violate its princi-
ples, courts can certainly take the amendment's general purpose into con-
sideration in the balancing process."8 Consequently, a program designed
tions drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The
clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official
state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1872).
13 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
114 Where racial classifications are being used ostensibly to remedy deprivations arising
from past and continuing racial discrimination, however, a court might think it proper
to judge the measures by a less stringent standard of review, possibly even the permis-
sive or rationality standard normally used in constitutional appraisal of regulatory
measures.
Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1107.
"I Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society - Judicial Activism or
Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18 (1968) (emphasis in original).
"' See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
W7 Indeed, though Justice Miller had stated in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1872), that he felt it was doubtful "whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision," id. at 81, the equal protection clause was subse-
quently applied to other than minority race problems. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 105 &
106 supra.
518 We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection .... But
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to promote, rather than injure, the interests of minorities might appear to
warrant only minimal scrutiny.
Though the argument for less rigid scrutiny of purportedly benign
racial classifications deserves consideration, it is more likely that courts
will employ the compelling interest test when confronted by a racial classi-
fication that is not benign toward all parties affected. Indeed, the
Washington Supreme Court found that the stricter standard was war-
ranted by DeFunis' claim of reverse discrimination. Elaborating, it stated
that though the purpose of the classification was constructive and reme-
dial, it was not benign in its effect on displaced white students.11 Strong
arguments can be made in support of this view. Clearly, the broad social
changes being sought may only be accomplished at the expense of some
individuals' rights.' However, it would seem more acceptable if, as im-
plied by the compelling interest doctrine, this expense be incurred only to
correct extreme conditions. Furthermore, the possibility exists that the
future hostile classification may find support in prior decisions upholding
a benign classification. "[W]hat appears to be benign today may well be
exposed as invidious tomorrow."'' Thus, it may work to the benefit of all
that a compelling interest be demanded of any classification that involves
race.
Compelling State Interests in Law School Enrollments
There are morally and socially "compelling" state interests which
attest to the benefits to be gained by increased minority enrollment in law
schools. The shortage of minority attorneys is acute. For example, while
blacks comprise at least 12 percent of the nation's population, they com-
prise approximately 1 percent of the legal profession." Such statistics may
indicate that the profession as currently structured, does not meet the
what we do say, and what we wish to be understood is, that in any fair and just
construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to
the purpose which we have said was the prevading spirit of them all, the evil which
they were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitu-
tion, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law
can accomplish it.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872).
82 Wash. 2d at __, 507 P.2d at 1182.
" See Hughes, supra note 67, at 1072.
121 Comment, Increasing Minority Admissions in Law Schools - Reverse Discrimination?,
20 BuFFALO L. REv. 473, 480 (1971). See also Vieira, supra note 21, at 1612 ("Experience surely
suggests that in matters of race what seems benign one year may be exposed as invidious the
next.") See generally O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority
Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971).
"I Ass'N OF AM. LAw ScHooLs, REPORT OF THE ADvIsoRY COMMrrrE FOR THE MINoRrrY GRoUPs
STUDY, 1967 PROCEMINGS, pt. 1, § I, at 160. Even more disturbing is the fact that only 17%
of this group practice in the South where the majority of blacks live. Gellhorn, The Law
Schools, and the Negro, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1069, 1073 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Gellhorn].
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needs of minority communities. The low percentage of black lawyers cer-
tainly does nothing to refute the claim that "[lI]egal services are still the
preserve of middle and upper incomes."'2
An increase in the number of minority law students will lead to both
long and short-term benefits for society as a whole and for the minority
community. Arguably, clients' rights would be more effectively protected
by attorneys who share similar backgrounds and characteristics. It is also
possible that a minority individual would more readily seek redress for
grievances by resorting to the legal process if he could repose his trust and
confidence in a lawyer of a minority race.1'2 Additionally, the inextricable
link between the legal profession and the political process illustrates that
equal access to policy making decisions can best be achieved through the
involvement of attorney representatives of the minority community. As
stated by the Washington Supreme Court, "[11f minorities are to live
within the rule of law, they must enjoy equal representation within our
legal system."'2
The position of respect held by a minority attorney may further serve
to promote state interests. The socio-economic importance is evident when
it is recognized that disrespect for a group as a whole is closely connected
to that group's economic depression. Elimination of one will often lead to
elimination of the other. "' Additionally, the position of respect generated
by the status of an attorney will have a beneficial effect on minority youth.
A young person may see these attorneys as models to emulate, as individu-
als who started with the same disadvantages as himself, yet who were able
to achieve success. This, in turn, will promote greater faith in the system
by helping to eliminate the claim that the "white man's" law is controlling.
Another goal found constitutionally compelling by the Washington
court was that of achieving diversity in the law school's student body.,"
The learning process consists of more than mere academic pursuit. The
interaction that occurs between students is an educational experience in
itself. Diversification promotes understanding and cultural exchange. In-
stead of a limited perspective, both minority -and nonminority students,
through their interaction, can develop a broader understanding of the
problems facing society. 121 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in
recognizing the intangible qualities of a law school, has stated:
123 See Gellhorn, supra note 122, at 1074.
12 See Carl, The Shortage of Negro Lawyers: Pluralistic Legal Education and Legal Services
for the Poor, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 21, 22 (1967).
12 82 Wash. 2d at -, 507 P.2d at 1184.
128 See Hughes, supra note 67, at 1069.
"1 82 Wash. 2d at __, 507 P.2d at 1184.
"2 The sex of a student, his or her work experience or lack of it, and the area of the country
in which he was raised will provide a variety of backgrounds against which the individ-
ual law student will perceive law and the role of lawyers in society.
Brief for Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae at 13, DeFunis v. Odegaard,
94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974).
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The law school. . . cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and
institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from
the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is con-
cerned.29
It is vital that lawyers, in their roles as policy makers, be aware of the
problems and desires of all segments of society.
Balancing a Suspect Classification Against Compelling State Interests
Certainly, these factors are all commendable and indeed necessary
goals toward which to strive. Generally, a law school maintains the right
to determine which, if any, of these criteria shall be considered in judging
an applicant's qualifications for admission. This discretionary power is the
preserve of the academic community and not usually susceptible to judi-
cial interference. "What places [DeFunis] in a special category is the fact
that the school did not choose one set of criteria but two, and then deter-
mined which to apply to a given applicant on the basis of his race."'' 0 This
approach raises the question whether the admittedly valid state interests
previously discussed justify the selection of one person over another purely
on racial grounds. The Washington Supreme Court answered in the affirm-
ative and in so doing may have lost sight of the requirements of the equal
protection clause.
While a court may, and indeed must, take social and moral ideals into
consideration when rendering a decision, its primary concern must be with
the law. The law is the framework and the instrumentality through which
these other interests are achieved. It assures an orderly process intended
to protect, as best it can, the interests of all individuals. The equal protec-
tion clause, an integral component of the law, best exemplifies the con-
stant struggle for equitable results. Not only must there be legitimate
intentions behind a particular policy, but also the actual effects produced
by the program cannot serve to unduly burden a particular class. The
Washington Supreme Court simply looked to the worthiness of the goal as
justification for any means aimed at its achievement. This, however, is not
consistent with the requirements of equal protection. "The Equal Protec-
tion Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation
in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized." '' 3'
In reply to DeFunis' due process claims as to the arbitrary and capri-
cious character of the admissions policy, the court conceded that if the
acceptable aims could be accomplished by some method other than racial
classification the validity of the disputed plan could not be upheld., 2 It
I" Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
130 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1710 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
131 Id.
'13 82 Wash. 2d at -, 507 P.2d at 1185.
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properly concluded, however, that since the aim of the law school was to
increase minority enrollment, the consideration of race was the only effec-
tive means to do so. Yet, consideration of racial factors need not result in
the granting of preferential treatment on the basis of race. The program
employed by the law school was not an affirmative action plan designed
to actively recruit qualified minority persons. It was a program of racial
preference conducted in an arbitrary manner which ignored the very es-
sence of the goals of affirmative action. In effect, the school had merely
ignored previous inequities in its policy and had instituted new ones. The
Washington Supreme Court meritoriously presented compelling reasons
for implementing a race conscious admissions policy. Unfortunately, it
eventually validated an arbitrary program of racial partiality.
RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AYSENT PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
The United States Supreme Court found itself confronted with a diffi-
cult situation upon examining DeFunis. The case had served as a catalyst,
initiating an intense national debate that obscured the particular facts
involved. The issues had been drawn not around the policies of the Wash-
ington Law School, but around the entire area of race conscious affirmative
action programs. As a result, two camps had been formed - one opposing
remedial action on the ground that it is detrimental to nonminority per-
sons, and the other favoring some form of "temporary reverse discrimina-
tion" to make amends for past deprivations. A decision on the merits
would have placed the Court on one of those sides no matter how carefully
it attempted to limit its holding to the specific facts. It would have been
extremely difficult for the Court to reverse the Washington Supreme
Court's decision without sounding a death knell for the use of other race
conscious programs, such as affirmative action employment plans.ln At
any rate, the Court neatly evaded both the case and, for the moment, the
issue.
The Court, however, did take the opportunity to note that
[i]f the admissions procedures of the Law School remain unchanged, there
is no reason to suppose that a subsequent case attacking those procedures will
not come with relative speed to this Court, now that the Supreme Court of
Washington has spoken.'3
This, perhaps, was a cue to school authorities that their policies are in need
of certain changes. The standards which should guide the formulation of
admissions policies, in light of this warning, remain unsettled. The answers
may lie in an examination of Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, wherein
he establishes a middle ground approach to the problem.
'3 See text accompanying notes 69-96 supra.
131 94 S. Ct. at 1707 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Justice Douglas rejects the idea that the issue must necessarily pit the
traditional meritocratic process against egalitarian principles. Instead, he
envisions a union of these two concepts. Though his decision was not, and
probably never will be, adopted by the Court in its entirety, it is deserving
of close scrutiny. It is a clear admonition to the Washington Law School
that laudable goals do not justify unacceptable means. At the same time,
however, it points to valid methods of accomplishing the aim of increasing
minority enrollment.
The theme of Justice Douglas' opinion is racial neutrality. Through-
out, he employs the phrase "in a racially neutral way," indicating an
outright rejection of racial preference." 5 Additionally, however, he points
out the necessity of racial classifications under the present system of law
school admissions. Despite the apparent incongruity in such an approach,
none exists. Justice Douglas was able to distinguish, where the Washington
court did not, between classification by race and selection by race. The
latter is constitutionally impermissible. The former is not only a legitimate
means, but the only means of effectively selecting "in a racially neutral
way.'"13'
Basic to an understanding of Justice Douglas' opinion is his distaste
for such standardized yardsticks as the Law School Admissions Test
(LSAT). He views the LSAT as rewarding the ability to answer questions
while stifling creativity and independence. 7 He feels these exams are
"3 There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. The years of slavery did
more than retard the progress of Blacks. Even a greater wrong was done the whites by
creating arrogance instead of humility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of
a superior race. There is no superior person by constitutional standards. A DeFunis
who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to
any disability, no matter his race or color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional
right to have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral
manner.
Id. at 1716.
' Id. at 1717.
"3 The numerical indicators normally used by law schools to evaluate an applicant's qualifi-
cations may prove inadequate when applied to a disadvantaged minority member. Many
standardized exams are thought to be "culturally biased." See Note, The Legal Implications
of Cultural Bias in the Intelligence Testing of Disadvantaged School Children, 61 GEO. L.J.
1027 (1973). The author theorizes that the use of standardized tests results in a mislabeling
of poor or minority children within the educational system.
The hypothesis of mislabeling begins with the contention that in the historical develop-
ment of standardized intelligence tests neither racial nor socio-economic subpopula-
tions have been properly considered. The norming groups used in the re-scaling of
sample scores have not been truly representative of the background and cultural devel-
opment of certain children being tested - those who are not white and middle- or
upper-class. This deficiency is dictated by the demographic composition of the total
population, race being closely aligned with socio-economic status and not being a
controlled factor in constructing sample groups. Moreover, since the white, middle-
class segment of the population has exerted the primary influence in operating the
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fraught with "cultural bias" and thus prove inadequate when applied to a
minority person. Additionally, he notes that the admissions policies of law
schools need not be based solely upon numerical data. Indeed, other factors
such as recommendations, employment experience, and even geographical
origins have been used to supplement the qualitative elements of an appli-
cation.3 8 A committee could validly look to the particular obstacles an
individual has faced and conquered during his life to determine his poten-
tial for success.'3 9
Such an approach would require a thorough examination of each ap-
plicant, an administratively tedious task. However, it would avoid the
application of a racial standard, since
American educational system, public schools naturally have perpetuated the language,
literature, and values of that segment. Hence, not only have the designers of intellig-
ence tests included in the normative groups primarily white, middle-class children, but
this pattern of 'Anglo-centricity' has been reinforced by the continued use of items on
these tests which measure performance by the standards of a white, middle-class
society.
The end result is that standardized intelligence tests do not in fact measure the
innate mental ability of disadvantaged children, but rather the degree of their cultural
orientation to an alien, though dominant society.
Id. at 1030-31.
Similar hypotheses have been applied to the law school admissions process to support
those who favor a change in procedures designed to overcome the "cultural bias."
Qualifications to study law should not be confused or equated with methods used to
determine qualifications, unless, of course, the methods used to determine qualifica-
tion are inclusive of all possible methods. It would be of little value to say one has the
ability to study law if there were no possible way to determine that ability. The
question is: how is qualification to be determined? ...
None of the . . . justifications for present methods of determining qualification
to study law are applicable to the Negro youth. He has not been sufficiently exposed
to cultural advantages and educational materials which tend to develop innate abili-
ties. . . . This being true, many Negro youth may be excluded from the study of law,
not because they lack ability, but rather because inappropriate means of determining
their ability have been and are being employed . . . . The only satisfactory test to
determine a Negro's ability to study law is to afford him an opportunity to do so.
Carl & Callahan, Negroes and the Law, 17 J. LEAL ED. 250, 258-59 (1965) (emphasis in
original). But see Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School,
119 U. PA. L. REv. 351 (1970), wherein the author states:
If 'cultural deprivation' means lack of exposure to and experience with difficult written
materials and abstract reasoning, it will undoubtedly adversely affect performance on
the LSAT and in college. There is no reason, however, to think that it will adversely
affect performance in law school any less . . . . It is difficult to accept that 'cultural
deprivation' results not in deficiency in essential law school skills but merely in ability
to demonstrate them and that they are likely to appear for the first time in law school.
Id. at 358.
In 94 S. Ct. at 1710.
131 To illustrate this point, Justice Douglas suggests a black ghetto resident, who has struggled
every step of the way through college, may, in the eyes of the admissions officer, evidence
traits which would allow for his selection over a Harvard graduate from a rich family who
has not made better use of the opportunities presented to him. Id. at 1713.
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a poor Appalachian white, or a second generation Chinese in San Francisco,
or some other American whose lineage is so diverse as to defy ethnic labels,
may demonstrate similar potential and thus be accorded favorable considera-
tion by the committee." 0
Thus, without selecting according to race, and by concentrating less on
LSAT scores, a school could constitutionally use its discretion and follow
a policy which would increase its minority enrollment.
The Washington Law School, however, did not employ any such
guidelines. It chose to rely more on neat subcategories than to make indivi-
dual judgments. The school classified by race and applied a separate stan-
dard to minority groups, resulting in less qualified applicants being admit-
ted. This was particularly distasteful to Justice Douglas, who asserts that
no race is unable to academically compete with another."' All that is
required is an equalization of the qualification standards.
Justice Douglas further reasons that although the school did not uti-
lize an absolute racial preference, the effect of its program was to apply
certain unascertainable standards to one group on the basis of race. The
result, whether it be termed a quota or not, was to limit the number of
possible places in the school available to DeFunis and other white students
similarly situated. Comparing minority applicants solely with other minor-
ity applicants necessitated the reservation of a certain number of seats for
those of the selected group. Justice Douglas concluded that this selection
process involved classification by race to the disadvantage of DeFunis and
had to be strictly scrutinized under the equal protection clause. However,
he never expressly reveals the possible compelling interests to be consid-
ered in testing the classification.
The import of his opinion lies in its establishing the distinction be-
tween the utilization of race as a classification and its use as a tool of
selection. Racial classification is not necessarily at odds with a policy of
treating "each application in a racially neutral way.""' As Justice Douglas
points out, once it is apparent that the indicia relied upon by a school are
"culturally biased" numerical tests, the admissions procedure is tainted.
The only logical solution, therefore, is to filter out those who would be
adversely affected and process them separately-the result being selection
based on individual merit. Classification by race merely serves the limited
function of identifying those who are culturally disadvantaged. This must
140 Id.
14, It may well be that racial strains, racial susceptibility to certain diseases, racial sensi-
tiveness to environmental conditions that other races do not experience may in an
extreme situation justify differences in racial treatment that no fair-minded person
would call 'invidious' discrimination. Mental ability is not in the category. All races
can compete fairly at all professional levels.
Id. at 1719.
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be done, "lest race be a subtle force in eliminating minority members
because of cultural differences."'' Herein lies the necessity for the racial
classification. If admissions committees fail to recognize race as a factor,
they eliminate the possibility of fairly evaluating one whose cultural back-
ground is different from the so-called "organization man."
Society's goal, declares Justice Douglas, should not be an homogeniza-
tion of its people, nor should it be an absolute separation by race or ethnic
background with "Black lawyers for Blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jew-
ish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for the Irish.''4 Diverse groups comprise
this "melting pot," and the various cultures should have an opportunity
for fair treatment. A categorization by race in order to evaluate a minority
person's capabilities would assure that his race does not "militate against
him." At the same time, such a procedure need not result in the granting
of a preference. Preferential selection on racial grounds is anathema to
Justice Douglas, who condemns deviations from the dictates of equal pro-
tection simply because meritorious social goals can be presented in justifi-
cation. To permit such deviations would result in "constitutional guaran-
tees [acquiring] an accordionlike quality."'' 5 Justice Douglas believes the
suggestion that minority groups cannot successfully compete without a
crutch creates just as severe a stigma of inferiority as does segregation.
Justice Douglas concedes that inescapable problems would be encoun-
tered by both schools and courts should proportionate representation of
selected minority groups be required. The difficulty in determining stan-
dards to judge which groups are in need of this benefit would place a
school's discretionary authority constantly before the courts. Conse-
quently, he proposes that educators must be able to make discretionary
judgments. However, in making such judgments, they should be required
to consider "applications in a racially neutral way," thereby avoiding
equal protection challenges.
The Douglas dissent is concluded with what appears to be a contradic-
tion in terms. On the one hand, he declares that a racial preference granted
by a state school at the professional level is "invidious" discrimination.
Yet, he hesitates to conclude that the Washington policy entailed such a
preference. However, implicit in his discussion is the warning that in the
future, similar programs may not pass constitutional muster.
CONCLUSION
The concept of a "color-blind" constitution is clearly without validity.
There can be no doubt that racial consciousness is an essential ingredient
in the process of reversing the effects of years of segregation and discrimi-
1 Id. at 1715.
', Id. at 1718.
"' Id. at 1719.
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nation. Consequently, the utilization of some form of racial classification
is mandated. However, the limits of such categorizations, as well as the
fate of programs employing them, remain uncertain.
Affirmative action programs aimed at increasing minority representa-
tion in traditionally segregated areas of employment have survived the
strongest of challenges in the courts. The evidence of past discrimination
combined with federal mandates to correct the situation have greatly
contributed to this success. Claims of "reverse discrimination," the most
potent arguments in opposition to remedial measures, have been faced and
found unconvincing. The judiciary has thus far been able to validate af-
firmative action programs in accordance with the dictates of the equal
protection clause.
The solution to the problem presented in DeFunis, on the other hand,
appears to be somewhat more elusive. It seems clear that if an admissions
policy like that utilized by the Washington Law School comes again before
the Court, it will probably be declared unconstitutional. If, however, school
authorities take heed of Justice Douglas' message, they may be able to
promote the goals they seek through a procedure consistent with the de-
mands of equal protection. A proper starting point would be a reevaluation
of present methods of selecting applicants. Though Justice Douglas' sug-
gestion that LSAT's should be abolished is likely to be met by staunch
opposition, a compromise involving the concept of individual evaluation
appears to be a viable solution.
